Abstract. This paper presents an ID-based serial multisignature scheme using bilinear pairings. We use Hess's ID-based signature scheme as the base scheme for our multisignature scheme. Our scheme requires a forced verification at every level to avoid the overlooking of the signatures of the predecessors. We show that the scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Shamir [18] introduced the concept of ID-based cryptosystems where, a user's public key could be easily derived from his identity and the user's private key is generated by a trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG). ID-based cryptosystems are advantageous over the traditional public key cryptosystems (PKCs), as key distribution and revocation are not required. A verifier can verify a signature just by using the signer's identity.
In day-to-day life, many legal documents require signatures from more than one party e.g. contracts, decision making processes, petitions etc. To meet these requirements in the digital environment, cryptography provides a mechanism known as multisignature. A multisignature scheme provides:
-multiple signers to generate a signature for a single message -a convincing mechanism to the verifier that each stated signer had signed the message.
A multisignature scheme is practicable when the size of the multisignature by n signers is less than the total size of n signatures in the single signature scheme, on which the multisignature scheme is based. Accordingly, the verification cost gets reduced. Based on the nature of applications, the multisignatures have been categorized into two types: serial and parallel. In serial multisignature, a signer signs the message and sends it to the next signer for further processing; the next signer after verifying his predecessor's signature, signs the received signed component. The message signing is considered complete when the last signer's signature is appended. In the case of parallel multisignature, the signature of each signer is carried out on the content of the message but not on the signatures of the other signers. Many financial transactions require serial multisignatures and verification at each level like maker-checker, wherein the maker, checker and approval concept is being followed in a sequence and every signer is logically forced to verify his immediate predecessor's signature. Our scheme, presented in this work requires a forced verification at every level to avoid the overlooking of the signatures of the predecessors.
In this paper, we propose an ID-based serial multisignature scheme using bilinear pairings. We use Hess's ID-based signature scheme [8] as the base scheme for our multisignature scheme. The scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model assuming weak Deffie-Helman problem is hard.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the related works. In Section 3, we describe background concepts on bilinear pairings and some related mathematical problems. In Section 4, we present our proposed serial multisignature scheme and analyze the scheme in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Related Work
In 1983 Itakura and Nakamura [10] first introduced the notion of multisignature. Since then, several schemes [2] , [5] , [7] , [9] , [11] - [13] , [15] - [17] for multisignatures have been proposed. The proposal of [7] was cryptanalyzed by [9] . Ohta et al. [15] proposed a scheme to avoid the restriction on the signing order. The security analysis of the scheme [16] does not consider the key generation phase. A formal notion of security for multisignature was proposed by Micali et al. [13] . Then, Lin et al. [12] proposed a structured multisignature scheme from the Gap-Diffie-Hellman group. Recently, Boldyreva [2] proposed a generic notion of security for multisignature scheme based on bilinear pairings. In 2001 Lin et al. [11] proposed ID-based structured multisignature scheme on which successful attack was carried out by Mitchell [14] . In 2003, Chen et al. [6] proposed a multi proxy signature scheme using parallel multisignatures.
Background Concepts
In this section, we briefly review the basic concepts on bilinear pairings and some related mathematical problems.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group of prime order q, G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order and P be a generator of G 1 . A bilinear map e is defined as e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
Bilinear: e(aR, bS) = e(R, S) ab ∀R, S ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q . This can be restated as ∀R, S, T ∈ G 1 , e(R + S, T ) = e(R, T )e(S, T ) and e(R, S + T ) = e(R, S)e(R, T ). Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of G 1 , then e(P, P ) is a generator of G 2 . In other words e(P, P ) = 1. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(R, S) ∀R, S ∈ G 1 .
In general implementation, G 1 will be the group of points on an elliptic curve and G 2 will denote a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field. Typically, the mapping e will be derived from either the Weil or the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. We refer to [3] for more comprehensive description on how these groups, pairings and other parameters are defined.
Computational Problems
Now, we give some computational problems, which will form the basis of security for our schemes. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two elements R, S ∈ G 1 , find an integer n ∈ Z * q , such that S = nR whenever such an integer exists.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP):
For any a, b ∈ Z * q , given < P , aP , bP >, compute abP . Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem(DDHP): For any a, b, c ∈ Z * q , given < P , aP , bP , cP >, decide whether c ≡ ab mod q. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP): For any a, b, c ∈ Z * q , given < P , aP , bP , cP >, compute e(P, P )
abc .
Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem(GDHP):
A class of problems where CDHP is hard while DDHP is easy. Weak Diffie-Hellman Problem(WDHP): For S ∈ G 1 and for some a ∈ Z * q , given < P, S, aP > compute aS.
Proposed Serial Multisignature Schemes
The entities involves in our scheme are the Private Key Generator (PKG), set of Signers S and the Verifier V. The proposed serial multisignature scheme consists of four phases: Setup, Private Key Extraction, Multisignature Generation and Multisignature Verification.
Setup
PKG publishes system parameters params={G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, P pub , H, h}, here G 1 is a cyclic additive group and G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group with prime order q. P (∈ G 1 ) is a generator of G 1 , e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map between the groups G 1 and G 2 , H : {0, 1} * → G * 1 and h : {0, 1} * × G 2 → Z * q where G * 1 = G 1 \ {0} are the cryptographic hash functions. P pub = s 0 P is the public key of the PKG where s 0 ∈ Z * q is master secret of the PKG.
Private Key Extraction
Let the set of n Signers with identities I={ID 1 , ID 2 ,...,ID n } ∈ {0, 1} * . For the signer with ID i the public key Q IDi = H(ID i ) and the private key is S IDi = s 0 Q IDi .
Multisignature Generation
In this phase n signers with identities {ID 1 , ID 2 ,...,ID n } ∈ {0, 1} * sequentially generate the multisignature and the final signer sends it to the verifier. To have a multisignature on message m, without losing the generality we present it in following stages.
Signature generation by First Signer:
To sign a message m the first signer, picks a random integer k 1 ∈ R Z * q and computes
The signature by the first signer is the tuple u 1 , c 1 ∈ (G 1 , Z * q ) and sends to the second signer along with the message m. Signature generation by nth signer as follows, picks a random integer k n ∈ R Z * q then computes
Then he sends the final multisignature u n , c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n along with the message m to the verifier.
Multisignature Verification
On receiving a signature u n , c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n and message m, the receiver verifies the signature by computing
accepts the multisignature if and only if c n = h(m, r n )
Analysis

Correctness
The verification of the multisignature u n , c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n is justified by the following equations:
So, one can verify c n = h(m, r n )
Security
Here we first define the adversary for our scheme and then present the security analysis. The adversary for our serial multisignature scheme (SMS) is defined with following capabilities: SMS-Adversary Given the system parameters params an adversary A SMS , which can ask hash and signing queries, executes the following ∀j ∈ [1, l] with given l.
-An SMS adversary A SMS selects a message m j , the ith signer S ij and the signer's identity ID ij . -Generates a valid partial multisignature u ij −1 , c 1j , c 2j , ..., c ij −1 by colluding with S\S ij , -Sends u ij −1 , c 1j , c 2j , ..., c ij −1 to S ij -Gets a valid partial multisignature u ij , c 1j , c 2j , ..., c ij from the S ij .
We say that the SMS adversary A SMS is successful if after l iterations of these steps, it can compute a multisignature for a message m such that m = m j and at least one ID of the signers is not in ID ij ∀j ∈ [1, l].
Theorem 1:
The scheme proposed in [8] is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model. Proof of the above theorem is also given in [8] . Theorem 2: The SMS is a secure serial multisignature scheme in the random oracle. Proof: Let A SMS be a polynomial-time adversary for our SMS scheme and let A HS be a polynomial-time adversary for our base scheme [8] . Utilizing the result of Theorem 1, we prove that our SMS is secure.
The idea behind this proof is that if A SMS manages to frame an honest signer by constructing a valid multisignature on an arbitrary message without interacting with this honest signer, then A HS can forge a previously unsigned message. A HS can query the hash and signing oracles with an identity ID for any arbitrary message. Whenever A SMS wants to get a valid multisignature scheme by framing an honest signer, it sends the signing query to A HS . Then, A HS forwards the signing query to its signing oracle using the identity and the partial multisignature given by A SMS . A HS returns the reply back to A SMS . It is easy to see that A SMS will be successful in its attempts if the reply from A HS is a valid signature. But, A HS generating a valid signature is a clear contradiction to the result of the Theorem 1. Hence the proof.
Conclusion
With Hess's ID-based signature scheme as the base, we have presented an ID-based serial multisignature scheme using bilinear pairings. Our scheme requires a forced verification at every level, which avoids the overlooking of the signatures of all the predecessors. Moreover, the verification cost does not increase exponentially like some of the existing multisignature schemes. To the best of our knowledge there is no existing secure serial ID-based multisignature scheme using pairings. We also proved that the scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model.
